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Nous reproduisons ici avec l’aimable autorisation des éditions Jacana, 
un extrait du chapitre 2 du livre Marikana. A view from the mountain 
and a case to answer, publié en 2012, quelques mois seulement 
après le massacre perpétré par la police sud-africaine à l’encontre 
des mineurs en grève de la mine de platine de Marikana, grâce au 
travail d’enquête et aux entretiens recueillis auprès des mineurs et de 
leurs compagnes par Peter Alexander, professeur de sociologie à 
l’université de Johannesburg et les membres de son équipe : Thapelo 
Lekgowa, Botsang Mmope, Luke Sinwell, Bongani Xezwi.  
 
The strike starts 
The assembly took place on Thursday 9 August, Women’s 
Day, a public holiday, at Wonderkop Stadium […]. At a rally held 
two days after the massacre, one of the leaders, Tholakele Dlunga 
(known as Bhele) narrated as follows: « For those of you who do not 
know, this started on the ninth, when workers of Lonmin gathered to 
try and address the issue of wage dissatisfaction... to try get our 
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heads together and find a way forward1 ». Various demands were 
being raised, and it was agreed that there should be a common 
proposal for R12 500 per month. However, the objective was to 
secure a decent increase, and the specific figure was seen as a 
negotiating position. Mineworker 1 expressed himself thus: « Yes, 
we demanded 12.5 but we... only wanted to talk. We wanted 
management to negotiate that maybe at the end we will get around 
8.92 ». The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) was not 
advancing workers’ claims for better remuneration, and the big 
problem was getting Lonmin to talk directly with the workers. For 
Mineworker 1 the thinking was: « We will go to the employer on our 
own and ask for that money... we will go to the employer ourselves 
because the work we do there is very hard and is killing us ». The 
practical conclusion was that workers would deliver their demand to 
the management the following day. 
The meeting brought together workers from across Marikana 
and it elected a committee that reflected the diversity of the 
workforce. According to one source, the original committee 
included two workers from the Western shafts, three from the 
Eastern shafts and three from those in Karee (Mineworker 1). NUM 
was still the dominant force in Western and Eastern while the 
Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU) 
prevailed in Karee, but union affiliation was not the issue. Another 
worker recalled that the committee was « representative of all 
cultural constituencies. It had to be made up of people coming from 
different provinces » (Mineworker 6). Women were not represented, 
however. According to Mineworker 7, a woman, this was because 
they were more vulnerable to victimisation by the employer 
− because there were fewer of them, so more obvious. Responding 
to the question « If they were not afraid they would have been 
                                                 
1  Speech in book. 
2  Interviewees were identified with a number in order to protect them from 
victimization. This was important. In the weeks after the massacre, many 
workers were tortured by the police. Interviewees were translated into 
English from the languages used by workers, principally isiXhosa. 





elected? » she said: « They would have been nicely elected3 ». Later 
on, the committee was expanded, and included people who had 
responsibility for organising the funerals and for welcoming and 
providing information for visitors (Mineworker 1 and 2). 
Significantly, a key responsibility of the original committee was, as 
Mineworker 3 put it, its ability to maintain « peace and order ». He 
argued: « [In] other strikes, people mess up and damage stores and 
beat people, things like that. So those people [the committee] were 
able to control people ». Mineworker 1 added that, in electing the 
committee, workers « wanted to make sure there was order ». In 
light of subsequent events, this commitment to peace and order, 
embodied in the leadership of the strike, is highly pertinent. As we 
will see, the workers were prepared to defend themselves, but they 
did not initiate violence. The main decision of the meeting was that 
the following day, 10 August, the rock drill operators (RDOs) would 
strike4. At this stage other employees were expected to work 
normally, though, in reality, without the RDOs production would be 
minimal (Mineworker 1 and 8). 
The strikers marched to the offices of Lonmin’s local senior 
management, located at the so-called « LPD » (Lonmin Platinum 
Division). They were met by a white security officer who said the 
managers would respond in 15 minutes. But there was no response, 
and after waiting for three hours the workers’ leaders pressed the 
matter, only to be informed that their demands had to be channelled 
through NUM5. Had the management met the protesting RDOs, the 
deaths that followed could have been averted, but NUM opposed this 
course of action (Mineworker 8). Mineworker 10 used the language 
of paternalism to express his frustration: « We blame the employer 
for not caring about us, because as a parent, as a head office, if there 
                                                 
3  Lonmin reported that in 2011 women were 4.3 per cent of its employees 
in « core mining operations ». Lonmin, Building for the Future: 77. 
4  RDOs, especially at the Karee shafts, had been engaged in recent battles 
with the management and were de facto leaders of the strike, at least to 
begin with.  






is a dispute in the family he will go and address it, find out what is 
the problem, so that his children will lay their hearts on the table 
[and] tell him "this is our problem" ». 
Rebuffed, the protesters returned to the stadium. There they 
agreed that the strike should be expanded to include other workers, 
starting with the night shift. They also convened a meeting of all 
workers, to be held at the stadium the following morning. 
 
The NUM shootings 
That next morning, 11 August, the meeting agreed to follow 
management’s instruction and put their case to NUM. Some of the 
workers justified this decision in terms of correct protocol. 
Mineworker 1, for instance, told us: « We decided to go to the NUM 
offices so that they can tell us what we should do now, because we 
went to the employer on our own and they [NUM] went and stopped 
us from talking to the employer, and we wanted them to tell us what 
to do ». Mineworker 10 put the matter this way: « We acknowledged 
that we made a mistake, that even though we did not want them 
[NUM] to represent us, we should have at least informed them that 
we were going to approach the employer ». Bhele said: « We 
admitted that we took a wrong turn6 ». The strikers marched in the 
direction of the NUM office, located less than a kilometre away in 
the centre of Wonderkop. It is important to note that they were not 
armed, not even with traditional weapons. According to Mineworker 
10, « We were singing, and no one was holding any weapon ». In 
answer to the question, « did you have your weapons then? », 
Mineworker 8 responded: « No we did not have our weapons on that 
day ». 
After passing the mine hostels, strikers turned left towards the 
NUM office […]7. But they never reached their destination. Before 
                                                 
6  See speech later in the book. 
7  As if signalling its allegiance, NUM shares a house with the Congress of 
South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the South African Communist 





them, at a point where the main road ahead was under construction, 
there was a line of armed men wearing red T-shirts. The strikers 
halted their march close to the main taxi rank to the right. The armed 
men opened fire. The strikers scattered, mostly in the direction from 
where they had come. But two men were left behind, badly injured. 
According to contributors in our Reference Group discussion, one of 
these managed to clamber over the fence that separates the road 
from the hostels, and was able to escape8. The second man got as far 
as the smaller taxi rank just inside the hostel grounds, where the men 
in red shirts caught up with him and, so our informants thought, 
finished him off, hacking him to death […]9. 
Jared Sacks researched the event, concluding: « Once striking 
RDOs were about 100–150 metres away from the NUM office, 
eyewitnesses, both participants in the march and informal traders in 
and around a nearby taxi rank, reported without exception that "top 
five" NUM leaders and other shop stewards, between 15 and 20 in 
all, came out of the office and began shooting at the protesting 
strikers10 ». That is, the men in red T-shirts were NUM’s Marikana 
leadership. Apparently security guards were also present, but fired 
their guns into the air (Mineworker 4). Sacks’ account is 
corroborated by the testimony we collected. None of the workers 
who described the scene doubted that the gunmen were from NUM. 
Mineworker 8 stated: « When we were near the offices we found 
them outside, those people, our leaders, I can put it like that, they 
came out. Our leaders came out of the offices already having guns, 
and they just came out shooting ». Mineworker 4’s account is 
                                                                                             
Party (SACP), and the governing party, the African National Congress 
(ANC). The neighbouring house is a small police station 
8  After we had completed our interviews we checked our findings with a 
reference group that included 14 strikers, many of them part of the 
leadership, six community representatives and two AMCU leaders. 
9  While the workers were firm in their recollections, the body has never 
been found. 
10  Jared Sacks, « Marikana prequel: NUM and the murders that started it 






similar: « We were not fighting them. They [NUM] were the ones 
who shot at us... It was the union leaders, the union committee. They 
were the ones who shot at us ». Mineworker 9 provided an 
interpretation: « They [NUM comrades] started shooting at us... It 
became clear that we were not accepted by the very union we voted 
for, and it also showed that they had strong relationships with our 
employers ». Similarly, Mineworker 8 concluded: « They [NUM 
leadership] don’t want us getting the money and I am very sure of 
that... because they are the ones who are always standing with 
management ». Mineworker 10 was shocked by NUM’s response: 
« When the NUM saw us approaching its offices it didn’t even ask, it 
just opened bullets on the workers », he said, adding: « We thought, 
as its members, it would welcome us and hear what we had to say, 
and criticize us, because it had the right to criticize us after we went 
over its head ». For our interviewees and our Reference Group, it is 
clear that many, probably most, of the people that were being 
attacked, including the man who died, were in fact NUM’s own 
members. Mineworker 10 said bluntly: « NUM shot its own people ». 
This was one of the most despicable moments in the history of the 
labour movement. A union’s leaders had consciously shot and 
possibly killed one of its members. The event was a turning point. 
Workers fled from the scene and headed towards the stadium. But 
security guards refused them re-entry, threatening to use force if 
necessary. The workers then headed for Wonderkop Koppie, the 
socalled « mountain », two kilometres further west. This would be 
their home for the next five nights and days, though, of course, they 
did not know this at the time. One advantage of staying on the 
mountain is that it provided a good view. According to Mineworker 
9, « The mountain is high [and] we chose it deliberately after NUM 
killed our members, so that we could easily see people when they 
come ». Though some workers went home at night, he and 
Mineworker 8 both refused to do so, because they had a fear of 
being killed (probably by NUM). Mineworker 8 described life on the 
mountain: « We were singing, talking and sharing ideas, and 
encouraging each other, that here is not the same as your house, and 





one has to be strong... You are just sitting here, and making fire and 
putting money together ». Mineworker 9 added: « We were helped 
by the people in the nearby shacks who brought us food ». It was 
only at this point, after the shooting of their comrades, that workers 
gathered their traditional weapons. Mineworker 8 responded to the 
question: « So it was NUM that pushed you into carrying weapons? » 
with: « Yes, because they shot at us and we were afraid that they will 
come back. We do not have guns, and so we thought it will be better 
that we have our traditional weapons ». Mineworker 1 provided 
valuable insight on the issue. « My brother », he began, « what I can 
say about the... spears and sticks [is] that we came with [them] from 
back home. It is our culture as lack men, as Xhosa men... Even 
here... when I go look at anything... at night [such as the cows]... I 
always have my spear or stick... or when I have to go urinate, 
because I don’t urinate in the house... I take my stick ». Then he 
added: « A white man carries his gun when he leaves his house, that 




On the Sunday, 12 August, workers went again to remonstrate 
with NUM officials. We can assume that this time they were carrying 
their weapons. Beyond the stadium, inside the hostel area, they were 
stopped by mine security (who included two « boers ») and 
« government police » who had a Hippo with them11. According to 
                                                 
11  Mineworker 1. This use of the term boer (literally « farmer » in 
Afrikaans) implies whites linked with forces of repression, such as the 
police and army. In practice, dating back to apartheid, most are 
Afrikaans-speaking, but they could be English speaking, and not all 
Afrikaans-speakers are regarded as boere. Our interviewees tended to use 
the term « Hippo » to refer to all armoured vehicles. Technically this is 
incorrect. The Hippo, developed for use in South Africa’s border war in 
northern Namibia and used against township protests, was replaced by the 
Casspir in 1978/9. Another frequently deployed armoured personnel carrier 
is the Nyala, which was specifically designed for riot control, 






Mineworker 4: « The mine security guards shot at us. But we did not 
go back. We kept going forward ». From subsequent conversations 
with workers we learned that two security men were dragged from 
their cars and killed with pangas or spears. Their cars were later set 
ablaze, and we saw the remains of one of these, which was located 
on a corner by the small taxi rank inside the hostel area. These new 
killings occurred close to where the striker had fallen the day before 
[…]. 
Monday, 13 August, was another day of bloodshed. Early in 
the morning, strikers received information that work was being 
undertaken at Karee No. 3 shaft (known as K3). Since this was the 
first full day of the strike it was not surprising that there was an 
element of scabbing, and a relatively small contingent was 
dispatched to explain to the workers that they were expected to join 
the action. Accounts of the size of this « flying picket » (to use a 
term from the UK) vary from under 30 to about a 100 Mineworker 2 
provided a detailed account that is corroborated in other interviews 
and by versions we received from workers in loco. At K3 the 
deputation spoke with security guards, who said that, while they 
would look into the matter, as far as they knew nobody was working. 
According to the workers, the guards told them that rather than 
returning to the mountain via the K3 hostel and Marikana, which 
would have been the easier route, they should take paths across the 
veld (mostly flattish rough ground with occasional thorn trees and 
other shrubs). For the hike back to the mountain the group may have 
grown a little, but all our informants placed its size at under 200 
people. At first the route follows a dirt track alongside a railway 
line. After a detour around a small wetland, the workers found their 
way blocked by a well-armed detachment of police that had crossed 
the railway line on a small dirt road and turned left onto the track. 
The precise size of the police contingent is unclear, with 
Mineworker 2 saying the police included « maybe three Hippos and 
plus/minus 20 vans » and a Reference Group contributor specifying 
about 14 Hippos but not mentioning vans (possibly treating 
armoured police « vans » as « Hippos »). The police forced the 





workers off the path and encircled them (with a line of police 
stretched out along the railway line). The workers response came 
from Mambush, later famous as ‘the man in the green blanket’ and 
probably the most respected of the workers’ leaders. He is reported 
to have said that, while they were not refusing to give up their 
weapons, they would only do so once they reached the safety of the 
mountain. Mineworker 2 recounts that a Zulu-speaking policeman 
then warned that he would count to ten, and if they had not conceded 
by then he would give the order to fire. After the counting had 
started the workers began singing and moved off together towards 
the weakest point in the police line, which was probably to the 
north-east, the direction of the mountain. At first the police gave 
way but, according to Mineworker 2, after about ten metres they 
started shooting, not only from the ground but also, at least later, 
from a helicopter. In the commotion that followed, three strikers (or 
two strikers and a local resident) and two police officers were killed.  
 
Failed negotiations 
On Tuesday, 14 August, a police negotiator arrived, 
accompanied by numerous Hippos. He was a white man, but 
addressed the workers in Fanakalo, which was regarded as novel for 
a white policeman12. He said that he came in peace, in friendship, 
and just wanted « to build a relationship » (a formulation used in a 
number of interviews). He requested that the workers send five 
representatives to talk to him. This was the origin of the « five 
                                                 
12  Fanakalo is a lingua franca developed on the mines during the twentieth 
century to facilitate communication between workers coming from many 
different language backgrounds, and between them and their bosses. It is 
based on Nguni languages, which include isiZulu and isiXhosa (the home 
language of most Marikana miners), with occasional words from other 
African languages, including Setswana (the main local tongue), and English 
and Afrikaans. Fanakalo is frowned upon by some of the more politicized 
workers, who see it as an oppressors’ language, and the mining companies 







madodas » (Mineworker 3). This literally means « five men », but it 
sometimes carries the connotation of self-selected or traditional 
leadership thus implying a certain « backwardness », in contrast to 
trade unions. In reality, as we have seen, the workers operated 
through an elected and representative workers’ committee, one 
typical of well-organised modern strikes. Nevertheless, the strikers 
selected five representatives, and sent them to talk to the negotiator. 
Mineworker 3 provides a detailed account of proceedings. The 
representatives claimed that the negotiator and his team refused to 
leave the Hippo and speak to them on the same level, face to face. 
They also refused to provide their names, which was disconcerting 
to the workers, and at some point, later on, an amadoda tried to take 
a photograph of the police on a cellphone, but this was stopped. A 
worker who was part of the delegation claimed that one of the senior 
police was a white woman and that a company representative was 
also sitting in the Hippo. This was denied by the police 
(Mineworker 3). Nevertheless, the five madodas conveyed the view 
that all they wanted was to talk with their employer. They wanted 
him to come to the mountain, but, if necessary, they would go to 
him. The police left the workers, leaving the impression that they 
would inform the employer of their request. However, when they 
returned the next day, Wednesday, 15 August, it was without a 
representative of the employer. Lonmin was refusing to talk to its 
striking workers. According to a strike leader, only three of the five 
madoda would survive the massacre that was imminent 
(Mineworker 3). Later on Wednesday, towards sunset, Senzeni 
Zokwana, president of NUM, arrived in a Hippo. Mineworker 10 
complained that: « We didn’t see him, we were just informed to 
listen to our leader ». Mineworker 1 concurred: « He was not in a 
right place to talk to us as a leader, as our president, this thing of 
him talking to us while he is in a Hippo. We wanted him to talk to us 
straight if he wanted to ». When he did speak, his message was 
simple, crude even. « Mr Zokwana said the only thing he came to 
tell us was that he wanted us to go back to work, and that there was 
nothing else he was going to talk to us about » (Mineworker 8). 





Apparently the workers repeated their demand that they only wanted 
their employer to address them, not Zokwana (Mineworker 8). 
About five minutes after Zokwana left, Joseph Mathunjwa, president 
of AMCU, arrived, and although he was accompanied by a Hippo, he 
came in his own car (Mineworker 8). According to Mineworker 6, 
Mathunjwa said that he was sympathetic to the strikers, but 
cautioned them that he too had been denied access to the employers. 
However, he added that because he had members at Karee he would 
try again to meet them the following day. The police presence had 
increased on the Wednesday, and on the Thursday morning, 16 
August, more forces arrived. This time the police were accompanied 
by « soldiers », probably para-military police dressed in similar 
uniform to the police, and they brought trailers carrying razor wire 
(which the workers mostly refer to as barbed wire) (Mineworker 8 
and 9). Mineworker 9 says that workers « shouted » for other 
workers to join them. In the early afternoon on this fateful day, 
Mathunjwa returned, this time without any escort (Mineworker 10).  
According to Mineworker 10, he told his audience that the 
employer never « pitched » for their scheduled meeting, using the 
excuse that he was at another gathering (presumably with police 
chiefs)13. Mineworker 10 added that Mathunjwa told the strikers 
they should return to work, because if they stayed on the mountain 
any longer a lot of people might die. There was some scepticism 
about this advice. For instance, Mineworker 2’s response was that 
Mathunjwa should « go back, because we are not AMCU members, 
we are NUM members ». Mineworker 8’s response was that, on the 
mountain, they had been eating together and making fire together, 
and it was like home. They weren’t leaving, he said, adding that 
« we do not want any union here ». Mineworker 9’s account was 
slightly different again. According to him: « We said, Comrade, go 
home. You did your best, but we will not leave here until we get the 
R12 500 we are requesting, and if we die fighting, so be it ». The 
last phrase resonated with a famous speech by Nelson Mandela, and 
                                                 






Mineworker 9 pursued this, albeit with a twist. He said: « We should 
talk and negotiate through striking, that is how Mandela fought for 
his country ». Mathunjwa made one last attempt to convince the 
workers. He went down on his knees and begged them to leave 
(Mineworker 2). Few accepted his plea. About twenty minutes later, 
at 15.53, the massacre began.  
 
The massacre of 16 August 2012 
There are photographs of the assembled workers when 
Mathunjwa was addressing them, just before he left the scene. They 
are a large crowd, roughly 3 000 strong, spread between the 
mountain, the hillock to its north and lower ground between the two 
[…]. They look peaceful, not threatening anyone. Yet, additional 
armed police were rapidly brought to the field around the mountain, 
and some were manœuvred into new positions, effectively encircling 
the workers. Much of this build-up was watched by strikers still 
sitting on the mountain. The media quickly retreated from just below 
the mountain to a safer position, from where they would record the 
opening of the massacre (Mineworker 6). Mineworker 8 reveals 
Lonmin’s direct involvement. Two « big joined buses from the 
mine » arrived delivering yet more police to the scene. Also 
« soldiers » appeared on top of their Hippos (these were probably 
Hippos of the classic kind). We later learned there were vehicles 
from each of the neighbouring provinces, but it seems there was 
even one, perhaps more, from the Eastern Cape. Mineworker 4 tells 
of strikers talking to homeboys from towns in the Transkei, and a 
witness quoted by Greg Marinovich mentioned that he’d been told 
that an Eastern Cape policeman had claimed « there was a paper 
signed allowing them to shoot14 ». Mineworker 8 says: « What really 
amazed me was that the truck that carries water and the other one 
that carries tear gas, they were nowhere near, they were standing 
                                                 
14  Greg Marinovich, « The Cold Murder Fields of Marikana », Daily 
Maverick, 8 September 2012. 





right at the back ». Ominously, mine ambulances were already 
present when the shooting started (Mineworker 8). 
 
 
             Mineworkers assembled at Wonderkop Koppie 
                  during the strike. Photo Greg Marinovitch 
 
A major concern for the strikers was seeing the police rapidly 
reel out the razor wire using two or more Hippos […]. This shows 
the approximate position of the wire, which was positioned in a line 
northwards from a pylon close to the electrical power facility and 
then took a turn to the right in the direction of a small kraal (the first 
of three in that area)15. Mineworker 2 said they were being « closed 
in with a wire like we were cows, and one of the miners’ wives said 
that the fencing was for rats and dogs16 ». 
                                                 
15  A kraal is a fenced area, roughly circular in shape, where cattle are kept 
overnight. They are also where cattle are killed. 






The comments are significant because the police had begun 
treating the workers as if they were no longer human beings. A 
group of the miners’ leaders, including Mambush, tried to 
remonstrate with the police. Their plea that a gap be left open, so 
that strikers could leave like human beings, fell on deaf ears. With 
guns aimed at the workers, it was clear that the police were now 
ready to shoot. A large number of the strikers rushed north 
eastwards in the direction of Nkaneng, where many of them lived. 
It was now that the first shot was fired. According to members 
of our Reference Group, this came from the side of the miners who 
were heading towards Nkaneng […]. Some fleeing strikers, 
including several leaders, now turned towards the right, hoping to 
escape through a small gap between the wire and the first kraal. 
Most continued northwards, so there were no hoards of armed 
warriors following this leading group, as suggested in some media 
coverage, though not by TV footage. One woman, a witness, later 
made the point that the strikers were running with their weapons 
down, and so were not a threat, and this can be seen in some 
photographs17. It was too late. The leaders’ path was blocked by 
Hippos, and they were trapped. Mineworker 2 recalled: « People 
were not killed because they were fighting... We were shot while 
running. [We] went through the hole, and that is why we were 
shot ». The order was given to fire. The command probably came 
from a white man, who did so, according to Mineworker 6, using the 
word « Red »18. There were no warning shots19. According to 
Mineworker 2, who was clearly present, « the first person who 
started to shoot was a soldier in a Hippo, and he never fired a 
warning shot, he just shot straight at us ». Within seconds seven 
workers had been slain, killed by automatic gunfire right in front of 
TV cameras [...] In photographs, their bodies are pictured in a pile, 
                                                 
17  Genevieve Quintal, « Marikana commission, observers visit hostels, site 
of shootings », Business Day, 3 October 2012. 
18  See also speech by Bhele in the book. 
19  See speech by a strike leader in the book. 





with a shack nearby. Moments later, another group of five men were 
killed, their bodies crushed against a kraal, as if cornered without 
any possibility of escape. Mineworker 8 questioned: « I get very 
amazed when the police say they were defending themselves, what 
were they defending themselves from? ». Some of the leading group, 
including Mambush, were able to turn back. They attempted to join 
other workers scattering in all directions20. Many fled north; some 
went westwards in the hope of reaching Marikana; others just ran as 
far as they could and as quickly as their legs would carry them; and 
one, at least, crawled a long distance across ground, hoping to dodge 
bullets and Hippos (Mineworker 4). It is difficult to imagine how 
terrifying and disorienting the situation must have been. There were 
armoured vehicles all around; there were helicopters in the sky; 
horses charging to and fro; police sweeping through on foot; stun 
grenades making a noise as loud as a bomb; tear gas; water cannons; 
rubber bullets; live rounds; and people being injected with syringes. 
This was not public order policing, this was warfare. A strike leader 
remarked: « Water, which is often used to warn people, was used 
later on, after a lot of people were shot at already21 ». Perhaps 
confirming this, on 20 August we found blue-green water-canon dye 
in an arc well to the west of the mountain, far from the initial front 
line. Similarly, Mineworker 10 asserted: « They lied about rubber 
bullets. They did not use them ». I have not heard of the use of 
injections before, and it remains to be seen why they were used and 
to what effect. Helicopters used a range of weapons. Of the 34 
workers who were slaughtered on 16 August, 12 died in the opening 
encounter. About eight died in various locations nearby. The 
remainder were killed in one small location. This is the place known 
by the Inquiry as Kleinkopje. But South Africa is littered with small 
koppies and it seems more appropriate to call it Killing Koppie. 
Here, some 300 metres to the west of the mountain, on a low rocky 
                                                 
20  Mambush did not get far. His body was found close to the first group of 
corpses. 






outcrop covered with shrubs and trees, the police killed 14 workers. 
On a grassy plane with few large bushes this was an obvious place to 
hide from bullets and Hippos, but it was relatively easy for the 
police to encircle and then move in for the kill. Two helicopters 
came from the north, depositing their paramilitary cargo, and two or 
three Hippos moved in from the south. Mineworker 9 told us: « That 
is where some of our members went in and never came back... the 
people who ran into the bush were ones being transported [in 
ambulances and police trucks] ». On 20 August, when we were 
directed to the Killing Koppie, we not only found letters on the 
rocks that had been spray-painted in yellow, marking sites from 
where bodies had been removed, we also saw pools and rivulets of 
dried blood discoloured by the blue-green dye22. Mineworker 5 was 
present on the Koppie; one of those lucky to survive. He recalls: 
« You were shot if you put up your hands ». Needless to say, he did 
not raise his hands. Rather, he says: « I was taken by a gentleman 
who was of Indian ancestry. He held me and when I tried to stand up 
I was hit with guns, and he stopped them » A drop of humanity in a 
sea of bestiality. Some workers were disarmed and then speared by 
the police (we heard this from a number of strikers including 
Mineworker 5). Whatever view one takes of the initial killings, it is 
clear that the men who died on the Killing Koppie were fleeing from 
the battlefield. Moreover, the precise locations of deaths and the 
autopsy evidence tend to reinforce the account provided by 
Mineworker 5, leading one to the conclusion that Killing Koppie 
was the site of cold-blooded murder23. […] 
* 
The bloodshed, cruelty and sorrow of the massacre could have 
led to the collapse of the strike. That is what Lonmin, the police and 
NUM had expected. But it was not to be. Somehow, surviving 
                                                 
22  Thapelo Lekgowa, Botsang Mmope and Peter Alexander, « Geography 
of a massacre », Socialist Worker, 21 August.  
23  See Marinovich, « The Cold Murder Fields of Marikana ». 





leaders managed to rally the workers and stiffen their resolve to win 
the fight. The bloodshed, cruelty and sorrow of the massacre could 
have led to the collapse of the strike. That is what Lonmin, the 
police and NUM had expected. But it was not to be. Somehow, 
surviving leaders managed to rally the workers and stiffen their 
resolve to win the fight. […] This was one of the most remarkable 
acts of courage in labour history24. 
 
Summary 
A few weeks after the south african police killed 34 people involved in the 
mineworkers’ strike at Marikana, on 16 August 2012, the author and his 
colleagues have conducted interviews with surviving mineworkers and 
trade-unionists involved in the conflict in order to understand what 
happened. Using the collected evidence, the article recounts the precise 
development of the strike and demonstrates that, considering the balance of 
forces and the massive scale of the intervention, it was a deliberate act: a 
cold-blooded massacre. This reconstruction is an extract of a larger book 
entitled: A view form the mountain : a case to answer. 
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Résumé 
Marikana, autopsie d’un massacre de sang-froid 
Quelques semaines après l’intervention armée de la police sud-africaine 
dans la grève des mineurs de Marikana, faisant 34 morts, le 16 août 2012, 
l’auteur et ses collègues ont réalisé des entretiens avec des mineurs 
survivants et des syndicalistes engagés dans le conflit afin de comprendre ce 
qui avait eu lieu là. Sur la base des témoignages recueillis, l’article retrace 
le déroulement précis de la grève et démontre ensuite, au vu du déséquilibre 
des forces et de l’ampleur de l’intervention, qu’il s’est agi d’un acte 
délibéré : un massacre de sang-froid. La reconstitution présentée ici est un 
extrait d’un ouvrage plus vaste intitulé A view from the mountain : a case to 
answer. 
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24  This paragraph is the last one of the book. 
